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Federal Indian law and policy, which largely concern the distinct status of
Indian individuals and tribes defined in part by descent,' increasingly face
Copyright © 2010 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of
their publications.
f Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. This Article is inspired and
guided by Professor Frickey's scholarship and support, just as I have been and will continue to be
throughout my career. It nevertheless reflects my distinctive interests and understanding of the
law, and I expect that Professor Frickey would have challenged and even disagreed with some of
its approach and arguments. Despite this, I dedicate it to him with my deepest thanks and
admiration, and hope that it contributes to our shared goal of creating normatively and
institutionally grounded frameworks for federal Indian law and policy. On a more personal note,
Phil was not only a great scholar, but a truly good man. His generosity to colleagues and aspiring
academics was unmatched, and will always be a model to me. I was lucky to know him, and am so
sad that we lost him so soon.
I. Although the legal definitions of Indian and tribe vary by context and do not solely or
always require biological descent from indigenous peoples, descent remains an important factor.
Thus definition as "Indian" for criminal jurisdiction purposes requires both some descent from the
indigenous peoples in the Americas before European settlement, and recognition of nonracial
affiliation with a federally recognized tribe. See United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223-24
(9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2001). Recognition as an
"Indian child" for purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act requires either membership in an
Indian tribe, or eligibility for membership and one biological parent who is a member. 25 U.S.C. §
1901(3) (2006). Although a child of no Indian descent may be included if he has been enrolled as
a member in an Indian tribe, Matter of Dependency and Neglect of A.L., 442 N.W. 2d 233 (S.D.
1989), in practice most tribes require some tribal or Indian descent from the tribe for membership.
See Kirsty Gover, Genealogy as Continuity: Explaining the Growing Tribal Preference for
Descent Rules in Membership Governance in the United States, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 243, 251
(2008-2009). The most common statutory definition of tribe is maddeningly circular, requiring
that the group be "recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the
United States to Indians because of their status as Indians." 25 U.S.C. § 450b(e) (2006). The
requirements for initial recognition as a tribe, however, are much more specific, and require both
political, social, and cultural cohesion and influence and descent from a historical Indian tribe or
tribes. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(b), (c), (e) (2009). Indian law, then, is the federal law that governs the
relationships between Indian tribes and the United States and the several states, and the special
laws that affect Indian people with regard to these relationships. See ROBERT T. ANDERSON,
BETHANY BERGER, PHILIP P. FRICKEY & SARAH KRAKOFF, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND
1165
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
challenges that they violate equal protection law. This Article argues that such
challenges stem from what Professor Philip Frickey has criticized as the
seduction of artificial coherence, and ignore the congruence of federal Indian
policy and equal protection as matters of constitutional norms, history, and text.
At their best, federal Indian policies undo the results of defining indigenous
peoples as inferior racial groups rather than sovereigns entitled to political and
property rights. This consistency between civil rights and tribal rights,
moreover, is affirmed by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, judicial
2precedent, and historical practice. Basic constitutional values and interpretive
principles support both equal protection and tribal rights, and militate against
any false dichotomy that would undermine the principles of equality and
respect on which both are based.
Philip Frickey's seminal contributions to federal Indian law include two
apparently inconsistent concepts. The first is his call to resist the impulse-
exemplified by the current Court-to "mainstream" federal Indian law by
demanding consistency between the legal principles governing Indian law and
those governing other fields.3 For Professor Frickey, to succumb to the
seduction of coherence is to deny the history of colonization of Indian tribes
and wipe away the doctrines that seek to ameliorate it.4 The second is a
rejection of the contrary impulse-exemplified by many accomplished federal
Indian law scholars-to see Indian law as a closed field guided by certain
foundational doctrines that can properly isolate itself from the continuing
tension between tribal and nontribal interests. This "foundationalist" approach,
Frickey shows, largely fails to describe how judges have or will decide Indian
6law cases. Instead, he argues, federal Indian law at its best is characterized by
close attention to both the history and the contemporary impact of federal
Indian law, and respect for the unique status of Indian tribes as a means to
mitigate the ongoing realities of colonialism.7
Nowhere is the seduction of coherence or the threat to Indian law of
heeding its call more apparent than in the area of equal protection. Federal
Indian law, a body of law entirely concerned with the special status of Indian
tribes and individuals, might seem irreconcilably at odds with equal protection
COMMENTARY 1 (2008).
2. See infra Parts I & II.
3. Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REv. 31, 48-49
(1996) [hereinafter Frickey, Domesticating].
4. Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 431, 435-36 (2005) [hereinafter Frickey, Exceptionalism].
5. Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature
ofFederal Indian Law, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 1137, 1206 (1990).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REv. 381, 384-85
(1993) [hereinafter Frickey, Marshalling].
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jurisprudence, which has increasingly rejected all descent-based classifications.
Although the Court has not reconsidered Morton v. Mancari,9 the 1974 case that
gave the federal government special discretion under equal protection to carry
out the unique federal obligations to Indian people, the need for a normatively
satisfactory reconciliation is becoming necessary as a matter of policy and law.
In 2000, the Court struck down a measure that provided descendants of Native
Hawaiians exclusive voting rights for state trustees of lands set aside for Native
Hawaiian benefit.'0 Since then, a proposal to provide political recognition to
Native Hawaiians has floundered on equal protection grounds," while
numerous other programs benefiting Native Hawaiians have come under
attack.12 In 2004, the Court reserved the question of whether the Duro Fix, a
federal law designed to advance native rights by affirming tribal criminal
jurisdiction over Indians that are not members of the governing tribe, violated
equal protection,' 3 and three justices, in concurrence and dissent, suggested
they might be amenable to such a claim.14 In the lower courts as well, equal
protection challenges increasingly undermine laws designed to protect the
rights of indigenous peoples.15
Although questions regarding the congruence of Indian law and equal
protection may seem more pressing now, they have existed since the framing of
the Fourteenth Amendment and have reappeared at key moments in its history.
The Reconstruction Congress debated the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment
on Indian tribes, and repeatedly invoked violations of tribal rights as a
cautionary tale in arguing for federal protection for civil rights.17 Fast forward
to the 1952 oral arguments in Brown v. Board of Education,18 and we find
several justices questioning the implications of ending separate but equal for
special schools for Indians.19 Finally, it is possible to see Morton v. Mancari20
8. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007) (invalidating a school choice scheme that made racial desegregation one goal in student
placement).
9. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
10. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
11. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 505 - NATIVE HAWAIIAN GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION ACT
OF 2007 (Oct. 22, 2007) [hereinafter Presidential Statement on H.R. 505] (setting forth Bush
Administration position that bill was racially discriminatory).
12. ARIELA J. GROss, WHAT BLOOD WON'T TELL 205 (2008).
13. U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 209 (2004).
14. Id. at 211-14 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that limitations on tribal jurisdiction
over nonmembers are constitutional in nature); Id. at 226-31 (Souter, J., dissenting) (same).
15. See Carole Goldberg, Descent into Race, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1373 (2002) [hereinafter
Goldberg, Descent] (critiquing this trend of allowing equal protection arguments to erode
indigenous peoples' rights).
16. See infra Part I.
17. Id.
18. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. See infra Part II.
20. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
2010] 1167
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
as an early, albeit unsuccessful, attempt to immunize race conscious measures
from the affirmative action challenges of the next decades.
This Article seeks a Frickey-esque approach to the tension between equal
protection and federal Indian policy. Such an approach recognizes the role of
history, text, and legal precedent as important tools of constitutional
21interpretation without seeing them as the only or best sources of legitimacy.
This approach also recognizes the value of interpretative methodologies that
promote under-enforced public law norms or contribute to "constitutional
evolution" 22 without violating the 'relationship of trust that the courts forge
with the American people."' 2 3 While committed to a pragmatic understanding
of the interdependence of institutions, it is also deeply normative, seeing within
the constitutional culture long-term commitments to democracy, fairness, and
equality that transcend the will of any single Congress, Court, or constitutional
convention. This normative vision is particularly clear in Professor Frickey's
work on federal Indian law, in which he draws attention to the violation of
constitutional norms entangled in the creation of our constitutional republic,
and highlights the ways that federal Indian law may mediate, albeit not undo,
this colonial reality.24
Equal protection law has emphatically not been one of Professor Frickey's
mediating techniques. He has blamed "a good deal of confusion" in federal
Indian law on references to analogies in other areas, in particular equal
25protection law. He notes that the fundamental issue in federal Indian law is
the structural relationship between sovereigns, rather than the relationship of
sovereigns to disadvantaged individuals that characterizes equal protection
claims. Understanding federal Indian law as a branch of equal protection law,
argues Professor Frickey, both undermines the logic of federal Indian law and
ignores the root of Indian claims.26
21. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Judge Wisdom and Voting Rights: The Judicial Artist as
Scholar and Pragmatist, 60 TUL. L. REv. 276, 309-12 (1985) (praising Judge Wisdom's minority
vote dilution cases, which remain controversial as a matter of constitutional interpretation, but
have the legitimacy of having influenced congressional voting rights cases).
22. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on
Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CALIF. L. REv. 685, 727
(1991).
23. Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal
Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CALIF. L.
REv. 397, 463 (2005) (quoting with approval Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court 2002 Term-
Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARv. L. REV. 4,
11 (2003)); Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 7, at 411 (endorsing Justice Marshall's approach to
interpretation of the Constitution and Indian treaties, which involves "significant deviations from
textual plain meaning to promote the spirit of the underlying constitutive documents").
24. See Frickey, Domesticating, supra note 3; Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 7; Frickey,
Exceptionalism, supra note 4.
25. Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 7, at 425 n.180.
26. Id. at 425.
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This insight, I will argue, is in fact closely related to a normatively
attractive resolution of the apparent conflict between federal Indian law and
equal protection. In an earlier article I argued that while racism is
paradigmatically understood as racial definitions of and discrimination against
individuals, the core way it has worked in Indian policy has been to deny tribes
political status by treating them as ethnic enclaves not entitled to the
prerogatives of governments. 2 7 Thus while laws and policies often treated
Indian individuals as amenable to civilization, the tribe and those who clung to
tribal customs were marked as inferior and denied self-determination and
property rights as a result.28
Because race-based discrimination manifested itself in denials of the
special status of Indian people and tribes, applying a model of equal protection
focusing on classifications of individuals to federal Indian policy is precisely
backwards. Despite sharp conflict over the definition of illegal discrimination,29
there remains broad agreement that an antidiscrimination norm lies at the heart
of equal protection.3 0 If the effect of racial discrimination is to see native
peoples as inferior racial groups rather than governments, an antidiscrimination
norm should lead to recognition of the political status of tribal groups, despite
the descent-based connections of their members.31 Although the Equal
Protection Clause itself does not necessarily require restoration and furtherance
of tribal sovereignty and culture, measures doing so are consistent with its
broader purpose of undermining state-sanctioned racial discrimination. The
doctrine of equal protection, therefore, should not be used to prevent such
efforts.
27. Bethany R. Berger, Red: Racism and the American Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV. 591,
593-96 (2009).
28. Id.
29. Compare, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (arguing that there never can be an interest sufficient to justify race conscious
governmental action under the Fourteenth Amendment) with Adarand, 515 U.S. at 247 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (arguing that governmental actions designed to benefit a disadvantaged minority are
constitutionally "fundamentally different" from those designed to discriminate against a minority
race); see also Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1991); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
30. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("[D]iscrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and
destructive of democratic society.") (quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT
133 (1975)); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 257-58
(Perennial Classics 2002) (1988) (stating that despite disagreement on the meaning of equality, the
Fourteenth Amendment "challenged legal discrimination throughout the nation and changed and
broadened the meaning of freedom for all Americans"); Lawrence, supra note 29, at 323 ("The
equal protection clause requires the elimination of governmental decisions that take race into
account without good and important reasons.").
31. See Berger, supra note 27, at 654.
2010] 1169
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It is true that similar arguments for a substantive equality-promoting
understanding of the Equal Protection Clause have had little impact in other
areas. 32 In federal Indian law, however, constitutional history, text, and long-
standing, judicially approved practice all support such an understanding. The
text of the Constitution provides support for recognition of the special status of
Indians in at least two places: first, in the Indian Commerce Clause, which
singles out Indian tribes as a special subject of legislation;33 and second, in the
Equal Protection Clause itself, where the use of the term "jurisdiction" may be
interpreted to accommodate the distinct status of Indian peoples.34 Further, the
role of the federal government in meeting obligations to Indian tribes has been
recognized throughout the history of the United States,35 despite the equally
long-standing breach of those obligations in practice.3 6 With the support of
constitutional text and precedent established, an understanding of why federal
Indian policies are normatively consistent with equal protection should have
significant force.
Part I of this Article describes the discussions of tribal status in the
Reconstruction era Congress, which framed and initially implemented the
Fourteenth Amendment. In these debates, advocates of Reconstruction
repeatedly invoked state violations of tribal rights to support arguments for
strong federal enforcement of civil rights. Rejecting arguments that the
Fourteenth Amendment fundamentally undermined Indian policy, these
32. Scholars have long argued that an approach that insists on individual equal treatment in
fact undermines meaningful equality. See, e.g., Gotanda, supra note 29, at 2-3 ("A color-blind
interpretation of the Constitution legitimates, and thereby maintains, the social, economic, and
political advantages that whites hold over other Americans."). Despite such arguments, the trend
of the Court has been to increase its insistence on color-blindness. See, e.g., john a. powell &
Stephen Menendian, Parents Involved: The Mantle of Brown, The Shadow of Plessy, 46 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 631, 632 (2007-2008) (asserting that in Parents Involved "colorblindness has
reached new ascendancy").
33. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress shall have the power "[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
34. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.").
35. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1831) (describing relationship
of Indian tribes to United States as that of a "ward to his guardian"); COHEN's HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 8 (2005 ed.) ("The centuries-old relationship between the United States
and Indian nations is founded upon historic government-to-government dealings and a long held
recognition of Indians' special status.").
36. See, e.g., COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 35, at 26-27
(noting contrast between legal force of Indian treaties and their lack of enforcement or
consummation by coercion); Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REv. 28, 46
(1947) (noting discrepancy between the "cases that mark the norms and patterns of our national
policy" and those that "illustrate the deviations and pathologies resulting from misunderstanding
and corruption").
[Vol. 98:11651170
EQUAL PROTECTION AND FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
Congressmen also insisted that the limited sovereignty of native peoples was
not only legally recognized but morally required. They further interpreted both
the Indian Commerce Clause and the "jurisdiction" referred to in Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment in ways that provide textual support for a distinct
status of Indians under the Equal Protection Clause.
Part II discusses the relationship between equal protection and federal
Indian policy since Brown v. Board ofEducation.37 Although there was initially
little doctrinal understanding of the relationship between tribal rights and civil
rights, the two movements proceeded along parallel tracks. With Morton v.
Mancari in 1974, the Court sought to reconcile equal protection doctrine and
federal Indian policy. Subsequent decisions, however, have maintained the
doctrinal reconciliation without developing its normative justification, leaving
the doctrine vulnerable to challenge and backlash.
Part III analyzes two targets of this backlash: the Duro Fix,39 the federal
statute affirming tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians; and
efforts to further the property and sovereignty rights of Native Hawaiians. This
Part shows how the problems addressed by each measure-the deprivation of
tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers, and the conceptual transformation of the
Native Hawaiian people from sovereign entity to an impoverished racial
group-were rooted in beliefs in the racial inferiority of indigenous peoples. By
moving away from the racialization of these groups and towards a political
relationship with them, therefore, both initiatives undermine racial
discrimination and further the goals of equal protection.
I
RECONSTRUCTION AND TRIBAL RIGHTS
Improving the status of Indians and tribes was neither the focus nor the
goal of the Reconstruction amendments or the Civil Rights Acts. Their central
purpose was to free the slaves and ensure that freedom was meaningful. But as
the other non-white, non-citizen group with a long history in the United States,
Indians inevitably figured in the debates of the Reconstruction Congress. The
subject was raised in two central ways. For advocates of Reconstruction,
violations of tribal rights, and particularly the showdown between the Cherokee
40Nation and the State of Georgia, were powerful examples of the need for
37. Brown v. Bd. OfEduc., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
39. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006) (1991 statute enacted in response to the Supreme Court's
1990 decision in Duro v Reina, holding that American-Indian tribes do not have criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember American Indians on the grounds that these tribes had been
implicitly divested of their inherent authority to prosecute all nonmembers, including nonmember
American Indians).
40. On the struggle between the Cherokee Nation and Georgia over the state's attempts to
have the Cherokee people removed west and assert state jurisdiction and ownership over Cherokee
territory, see JILL NORGREN, THE CHEROKEE CASES: Two LANDMARK FEDERAL DECISIONS IN THE
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federal power to prevent state deprivations of essential rights. Opponents,
conversely, argued against the Fourteenth Amendment by claiming it would
make citizens of the Indians. To counter this argument, proponents emphasized
the sovereign rights of tribes and the moral obligations these rights created.
Throughout the period, pro-Reconstruction Congressmen advocated preserving
the distinct rights of Indians in ways that suggest their consistency and even
complementarity with the goals of Reconstruction.
A. Reconstruction Era Debates
The most notable references to tribal rights in the Reconstruction era did
not specifically address the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on American
Indians. Gerard Magliocca has written about the repeated references to the
Cherokee cases in abolitionist and reconstructionist debates,4 1 but these
references were part of a broader condemnation by Republicans of violations of
tribal rights. For example, in 1866, Thaddeus Stevens, leader of the Radical
Republicans in the House, objected to a bill that would have extended state law
over Indian allotments in Kansas by telling the story of George Tassel, the
Cherokee man Georgia illegally hanged to avoid a Supreme Court
determination of the state's criminal jurisdiction over him. 4 2 According to
Stevens,
That is the manner in which the Indians are treated whenever they are
put out of the protection of the United States, and placed under the
control of the State laws. I trust that we shall never disgrace the
national legislation by any act which will give the sanction of law to
such an outrage as I have cited.43
When Representative John Hubbard questioned whether it was proper to build
schoolhouses and roads for Kansas Indians without subjecting them to taxation
or other obligations of citizens, Stevens replied by invoking the treaty
obligations to the tribes: "That depends on the original bargain, which it is
proposed we shall now try to evade.""
After ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Representative George
Hoar of Massachusetts called the treatment of Indian tribes "an instructive
FIGHT FOR SOVEREIGNTY (University of Oklahoma Press 2004). The battle, of course, initially
resulted in legal victory for the Cherokees in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), but ended
in tragedy as the nation was forced to walk west on the trail of tears. ANDERSON, BERGER,
FRICKEY & KRAKOFF, supra note 1, at 75.
41. See Gerard Magliocca, The Cherokee Removal and the Fourteenth Amendment, 53
DUKE L.J. 875 (2003) [hereinafter Magliocca, Cherokee Removal]; Gerard Magliocca, Preemptive
Opinions: The Secret History of Worcester v. Georgia and Dred Scott, 63 U. PIr. L. REV. 487
(2002).
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lesson" in favor of passage of the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act,4 5 which provided
federal authority to address violations of civil rights.4 For Hoar, this treatment
confirmed state participation in the abuse of out-groups, and the need for
federal intervention to prevent it. "The history of the Indian tribes within our
jurisdiction," he proclaimed, "is a history of violence, injustice, bloodshed,
rapine, committed often under the direct authority of the States. Whatever
resistance, feeble and impotent as it has been, has been made to all this has
been by the United States.A7
Four years later, Representative Joseph Rainey, the first African American
to serve in Congress, again invoked the Indian in debating the 1875 Civil
Rights Bill.48 "We do not intend to be driven to the frontier as you have driven
the Indian," he declared; "Our purpose is to remain in your midst as an integral
part of the body-politic." 49 In this statement, Rainey, a member of the House
Indian Affairs Committee, neatly encapsulated both the abuses committed
against Indians when they tried to maintain their historic territories, and the
differences between contemporary struggles of African Americans and
American Indians.
For advocates of Reconstruction, Indian history provided a potent
example of the wrongs committed by states and their citizens when not
constrained by the federal power. African Americans sought those rights
necessary for any individual to claim equality in American society: the right to
freedom, to work for wages, to hold and sell property, and to participate in the
legal and political systems that enacted and enforced those rights. American
Indians, in contrast, sought rights that were distinctly tribal: the right to
freedom from state jurisdiction, the right to territory, and the right to faithful
observation of treaties. Despite the surface inconsistency of equal rights for
African Americans and special rights for American Indians, for Republicans in
the wake of the Civil War, denial of the first was analogous to denial of the
second, and guarding against both was a federal responsibility.
B. Debates Regarding the Citizenship Clause
While proponents of Reconstruction invoked American Indians to further
their goals, so did those hostile to Reconstruction's aims. Numerous legislators
worried that the Fourteenth Amendment would make citizens of the Indians,
and while their numbers included a few Republicans along with the Democrats,
their sentiments rarely accorded with the principles of equal protection. In
45. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 335 (1871).
46. Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871), (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 241,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), 1988 (2006)).
47. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 335 (1871).
48. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, invalidated by The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
49. 3 CONG. REC. 959 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1875) (statement of Rep. Rainey).
11732010]
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response, the advocates of Reconstruction insisted the federally protected
sovereign rights of tribes prevented such a wholesale extension of citizenship.
Their discussions of the meaning of "jurisdiction" in the Fourteenth
Amendment, moreover, provide textual support for recognizing the distinctive
status of Indians under the amendment.
Opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment often included Indians in their
protests against extension of citizenship to non-white groups. Democratic
Senator Thomas Hendricks, for example, warned that conferring citizenship on
"the negroes, the coolies, and the Indians," would "degrade" the esteem and
pride that rank conveyed when limited to those "descended from the great races
of people who inhabit the countries of Europe."so Similarly, Democratic
Senator Reverdy Johnson, the attorney who successfully argued against Dred
Scott's plea for freedom in the Supreme Court, declared that "the rights and
liberties of the white men of this country are greater than can ever legally be
accorded to the inferior races," and denounced making citizens of the "negroes,
Chinese, and Indians."51
Although arguments that the Fourteenth Amendment did not grant
citizenship to Indians may seem inconsistent with the ideals of Reconstruction,
Reconstruction's advocates made such arguments in ways entirely consonant
with tribal rights. The central legal question in these debates was whether
Indians were "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States in the sense in
which the Fourteenth Amendment used the phrase.52 Arguments in favor
depended on assertions that tribes possessed no sovereignty and were subject to
the whims of Congress. Senator Johnson, for example, argued that the Indians
had "no sovereign power whatever," and the United States could do with them
"just what it thought proper."53 Core Republicans, in contrast, insisted that
although Indians were often subject to federal authority, they were not subject
to the "full" and "complete" jurisdiction intended by the Citizenship Clause.54
Such restricted jurisdiction was a matter of moral obligation as well as positive
50. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2939 (1866). This concern also appeared in
President Johnson's message accompanying his veto of the first Civil Rights Bill. Although the
bill specifically excluded "Indians not taxed," President Johnson noted that the "provision
comprehends the Chinese of the Pacific States, Indians subject to taxation, the people called
gypsies, as well as the entire race designated as blacks, people of color." President Andrew
Johnson, Veto Message, March 27, 1866. Gypsies were the peculiar bate noire of conservative
Republican Senator Edgar Cowan, a close ally of Johnson's. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2891 (1866).
51. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1067 (1868).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl.1.
53. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 506 (1866).
54. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2893 (1866) (Sen. Trumbull); id. at 2895 (Sen.
Howard); id at 2897 (Sen. Williams). This phrase therefore excluded not only Indians, but also
those born to diplomatic representatives of other countries. See id. at 2897 (1866); see also United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 659-60, 682 (1898) (stating that the phrase included all
but those who, like children of diplomats, alien enemies in conquered territories, and tribal
members, clearly had another allegiance).
[Vol. 98:11651174
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law. Senate Republican leader Lyman Trumbull, for example, argued that
although there were "decisions that treat them as subjects in some respects," it
would "be a breach of good faith on our part to extend the laws of the United
States over the Indian tribes with whom we have these treaty stipulations.,s
These arguments also drew on the force of the Indian Commerce Clause in
creating a distinct sovereign status for Indian tribes. Senator Jacob Howard
noted that the Constitution gave Congress the power to regulate commerce "not
only with foreign nations and among the States, but also with the Indian tribes,"
suggesting a "recognition of the national character. . . in which they have been
recognized ever since the discovery of the continent and its occupation by
civilized men."56 Ultimately, a proposal explicitly excluding "Indians not
taxed" from the Citizenship Clause failed. Democrats unanimously voted to
include it, while all but three Republicans voted against it.57
Although their proponents' stances on the Fourteenth Amendment surely
influenced arguments on both sides, similar Republican statements about the
status of Indian tribes appeared as early as 1862, well before the debates
regarding the Fourteenth Amendment or Civil Rights Act. In an April 11, 1862
speech, Representative John Bingham, who is credited with drafting the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment, passionately argued for extension of
citizenship to "every human being, no matter what his complexion."58 He
nevertheless asserted that Indians were the only exception to this rule, not
because they were unfit for citizenship, but because tribes had been
"recognized at the organization of this Government as independent
sovereignties. They were treated with as such; and they have been dealt with by
the Government ever since as separate sovereignties." 59 For Bingham, as for
others, such arguments appear to represent not only different strategic
positions, but also different understandings regarding the rights and status of
Indian tribes.60
55. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2894 (1866).
56. Id. at 2895.
57. Id. at 2897.
58. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1640 (1862).
59. Id. at 1639.
60. Of course much of the evidence the Representatives marshaled in support of their
arguments would soon disappear: that the United States made treaties with Indian tribes (which it
stopped doing in 1871, 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006)), that these treaties, rather than federal laws,
controlled Indians (something decided to the contrary by the Supreme Court in 1870, The
Cherokee Tobacco Case, 78 U.S. 616 (1870)), and that crimes by one Indian against another were
not within federal jurisdiction (which changed with the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(2006), in 1885). Well after these indicia of foreignness had disappeared, however, the Supreme
Court continued to hold that Indians were not "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States in
the sense of the Fourteenth Amendment. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 102 (1884); see also United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 659-60, 682 (1898) (stating that Indians, along with
children born to ambassadors and to alien enemies, were not made citizens by the Fourteenth
Amendment). More importantly, these facts seem to be the contemporary manifestations of a
separate, quasi-sovereign status, which is recognized to this day. See, e.g., United States v. Lara,
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These statements, of course, all concern the Citizenship Clause.
Application of that clause to Indians has been largely irrelevant since 1924,
when federal legislation made citizens of all Indians born in the United States.61
But similar language is used in the Equal Protection Clause, which prohibits
states from denying "to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." 62 Although there is a difference in the phrases ("subject to its
jurisdiction" in the Citizenship Clause versus "within its jurisdiction" in the
Equal Protection Clause), and although there should not be slavish adherence to
intratextualism in constitutional interpretation, the use of the same word in both
clauses of Section 1 provides room to recognize the unique political status of
the Indian in both.
The citizenship debates therefore further reinforce the consistency of
equal protection and federal Indian policies. Advocates of Reconstruction
repeatedly emphasized the sovereignty of Indian tribes, and argued that federal
obligations to tribes prevented denying that sovereignty. Their discussions of
the meaning of "jurisdiction" in the Fourteenth Amendment, moreover, provide
textual support for the unique position of Indians under the amendment.
C. Indian Policy During the Reconstruction Era
Immediately after its ratification, the Fourteenth Amendment was used to
challenge the sovereignty of Indian tribes in both Congress and the Court.
These challenges went nowhere. The Court ignored them and in Congress they
catalyzed a Senate Report strongly affirming the sovereign status of Indian
tribes.63 This rejection of alleged conflicts between federal Indian policies and
the Fourteenth Amendment so soon after its enactment bolsters arguments for
their fundamental consistency.
In December 1869, the federal government seized tobacco from Cherokee
factories on Cherokee lands for failure to pay federal tobacco taxes. 4 In
support of this action, the Revenue Commissioner argued that the Fourteenth
Amendment, by bestowing citizenship on all those born in and "subject to the
jurisdiction" of the United States, made the inhabitants of the Indian territory
liable to taxation, "any so-called treaties to the contrary notwithstanding." 65
Although the Cherokees lost the case, the Court's 1870 opinion did not discuss
the Fourteenth Amendment, relying instead on the principle that Congress
could abrogate Indian treaties via ordinary legislation.
541 U.S. 193, 203-04 (2004) (discussing implications of tribal status as "dependent sovereigns"
or "domestic dependent nations").
61. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1401(b) (2006)).
62. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl.2.
63. S. REP No. 41-268, at 11 (1870).
64. An Interesting Question ofRevenue Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1869.
65. Id.
66. The Cherokee Tobacco Case, 78 U.S. 616, 621 (1870). As I have discussed elsewhere,
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The Fourteenth Amendment was also initially invoked in efforts to end
treaty-making with Indian tribes. In 1869, House proponents argued that the
Fourteenth Amendment had granted citizenship to the Indians, making tribes
inappropriate treaty partners. In response, the Senate directed the Judiciary
Committee to prepare a report on the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on
Indian tribes. In its 1870 report, the Committee concluded that the amendment
has "no effect whatever upon the status of the Indian tribes within the limits of
the United States, and does not annul the treaties previously made between
them and the United States."68
Although the report relied in places on the practice of making treaties with
Indian tribes and the non-citizenship of American Indians to support its
69
argument, these references do not capture its normative thrust. The report
began with the following admission:
The white man's treatment of the Indian is one of the great sins of
civilization, . . . which it is now too late to redress.... But the harsh
treatment of the race by former generations should not be considered a
precedent to justify the infliction of further wrongs.70
Even after the Indians were "overshadowed by the assumed sovereignty of the
whites," the report continued, the tribes retained "the right to regulate, without
question, their domestic affairs, and make and administer their own laws," and
were not deprived of their "character as a nation or political community."7 ' The
report cited with approval the 1866 decision in The Kansas Indians,72 which
held that Kansas tribes retained their treaty-promised freedom from state law so
long as the federal government continued to recognize their organization.73 The
decision did not depend on some essential foreignness or physical separation:
the Kansas Indians in question lived on allotments in the midst of white
communities, and their "primitive customs and habits" had been "largely
broken into."74 Rather, the Court's holding depended on the rights promised the
tribes by treaty, and their entitlement to federal protection of those rights.
the decision did undermine principles favorable to Indian tribes in a number of ways. See Bethany
R. Berger, "Power over This Unfortunate Race": Race, Politics and Indian Law in United States
v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957, 2042-43 (2004). It also violated the continuing
principle that ordinary legislation will not be interpreted to abrogate Indian treaties absent clear
evidence of congressional intent to do so. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,
526 U.S. 172, 202 (1999).
67. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., Ist Sess. 560 (1869) (Rep. Butler).
68. S. REP. No. 41-268, at 1.
69. Id at 9-10.
70. Id. at 1.
71. Id at 2, 3.
72. In re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866). Also discussed in S. REP. No. 41-
268, at 7.
73. 72 U.S. at 757.
74. S. REP. No. 41-268, at 7 (quoting 72 U.S. at 738).
75. 72 U.S. at 755-56.
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Similarly, the Senate report recognized that although the federal government
had deprived tribes of true foreign status, it had promised them a measure of
their former sovereignty and the Fourteenth Amendment should not be read as
an excuse to violate that promise:
To maintain that the United States intended, by a change of its
fundamental law, which was not ratified by these tribes, and to which
they were neither requested nor permitted to assent, to annul treaties
then existing between the United States ... and the Indian tribes ...
would be to charge upon the United States repudiation of its national
obligations, repudiation doubly infamous from the fact that the parties
whose claims were thus annulled are too weak to enforce their just
rights.
Even though the Senate Judiciary Committee rejected the Fourteenth
Amendment as a reason to end treaty-making, Congress ended it anyway in
1871.77 The House of Representatives initiated the change out of resentment
that the Senate alone could approve treaties and thereby commit significant
78public funds without the House's input or control. Although questions of
whether Indian tribes were appropriate partners for treaty-making colored these
debates as well, 79 none of the representatives argued that the Fourteenth
Amendment required this shift in Indian policy. Congress, moreover, clearly
envisioned the continuing distinct federal treatment of Indians and tribes after
treaty-making ceased, stipulating that nothing in the prohibition "shall be
construed to invalidate or impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore
lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe."80 Over the
next decades, the Court readily upheld both implementation of existing treaties
and other laws recognizing the distinct federal status of American Indians.8 1
76. S. REP. No. 41-268, at 11.
77. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 566 (1871) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §
71(2006)).
78. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 763-64 (1871); id. at 1811-12.
79. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 764 (1871).
80. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 566.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 48 (1913) (holding that citizenship
was not an obstacle to federal jurisdiction over Indians); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371
(1905) (holding that Indian beneficiaries of off-reservation treaty fishing rights were not subject to
state property law in accessing their fishing spots); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294,
305 (1902) (holding that although tribes were recognized as separate communities and had treaties
with the United States they were still subject to ordinary domestic legislation); United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (upholding extension of jurisdiction over crimes between Indians).
One should not, of course, give to much credence to the Supreme Court that gave us the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), as an authoritative
interpreter of the Equal Protection Clause. Still, past precedents are important building blocks of
constitutional interpretation, particularly where they accord with contemporary constitutional
norms.
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D. Conclusion
Reconstruction-era debates provide several insights into the impact of the
Fourteenth Amendment on federal Indian law and policy. First, for advocates
of Reconstruction, respecting tribal rights was ideologically consistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment's goal of securing equality for African Americans.
Second, although some members of Congress argued that the Fourteenth
Amendment undermined federal Indian policy by granting citizenship to
Indians, these claims focused on the Citizenship Clause rather than the Equal
Protection Clause, and were generally made by opponents of the amendment.
In rejecting these arguments, advocates of Reconstruction expressed a clear
sense of the moral foundation for the continued separate status of Indians, one
rooted in both a long legal and historical tradition and the obligation to fulfill
promises made to indigenous peoples. Congress reaffirmed this recognition in
the period immediately after ratification, as the Senate insisted the amendment
should not provide an excuse to permit the United States to renege on its
promises. Throughout the Reconstruction era, we find a persistent sense of the
consistency of Indian and tribal rights with equal protection's goals, and a
conviction that the Fourteenth Amendment should not undermine them.
II
UNDERSTANDINGS OF EQUAL PROTECTION AND INDIAN POLICY IN THE
MODERN ERA
The modem era has yet to produce a decision that challenges the
consistency between equal protection and federal Indian law. Beginning with
Brown v. Board of Education82 and the post World War II period, there were
limited but important intersections between civil rights and Indian policy
debates. As Indian policy shifted toward self-determination in the 1970s, the
Supreme Court, in Morton v. Mancari,83 facilitated this shift by providing the
first direct judicial attempt to reconcile equal protection law and federal Indian
law. Mancari can be read to support a political relationship between Indian
tribes and the federal government that is both normatively attractive and
consistent with the goals of equal protection. Subsequent cases, however, have
done little to build on Mancari's potential, leaving the field normatively barren
and doctrinally vulnerable.
A. Pre-Mancari Intersections in Indian Policy and Equal Protection
Although contemporary discussions of equal protection and Indian law
usually begin with Mancari, they might appropriately begin much earlier with
Brown v. Board of Education. In the same period that Brown rejected the post-
Reconstruction validation of the separate but equal doctrine, policymakers
82. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
83. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
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struggled with how to respect the rights of Indians in the modem era. Although
these developments were rarely directly linked, Indian policy made a brief
appearance in the oral arguments in Brown, and Indian communities
experienced a similar resurgence of activism and increased respect for their
rights after Brown. Both the parallels and the rare intersections of the
movements for tribal and civil rights in this period provide helpful insights in
understanding current controversies.
The post World War II period saw dramatic social movements and
ultimately legal change for African Americans, and equally dramatic, though
less well-known, shifts for American Indians. In the decades following the
Civil War, federal Indian policy had grown progressively more coercive. The
government divided tribal lands among individual tribal members and sold
millions of acres to homesteaders and railroads, assumed jurisdiction to punish
crimes between Indians, corralled Indian children in federal boarding schools,
and erected Courts of Indian Offenses to regulate domestic and religious
matters.84 Policy began to shift back toward some measure of tribal control in
the 1930s with the Indian New Deal, but both the existing federal control over
tribal property and funds and New Deal imposition of governmental structures
on tribes left Indian tribes and individuals largely dominated by the federal
government.85
During World War II, vast numbers of Indian people left their reservations
for the first time for military service and work in the defense industry.8 They
returned newly insistent on their right to independence and a decent standard of
living. In these claims they had support both from the former Indian New
Dealers, who advocated greater tribal control at the same time as individual
Indian equality,87 and by their opponents in Congress, who saw New Deal
policies as dangerous communism but agreed on Indian rights to individual
equality and freedom from federal domination. As the New Deal opponents
came to dominate Indian policy, their calls for Indian "emancipation" did as
well." By the late 1950s, Indian organizations and tribes rejected Indian
emancipation as concealing further domination and impoverishment, and by
1970, federal policy shifted to embrace tribal calls for self-determination. 9 0 But
although advocates of Indian self-determination policy used the rhetoric of civil
84. ANDERSON, BERGER, FRICKEY & KRAKOFF, supra note 1, at 96, 101-07, 124-26.
85. Id. at 128-35, 138-39.
86. See ALISON R. BERNSTEIN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND WORLD WAR II: TOWARD A NEW
ERA IN INDIAN AFFAIRS 43, 68 (1991).
87. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 27, at 640-43; KENNETH R. PHILP, TERMINATION
REVISITED: AMERICAN INDIANS ON THE TRAIL TO SELF-DETERMINATION, 1933-1953, at 12, 14-
15 (1999).
88. See Paul C. Rosier, "They Are Ancestral Homelands": Race, Place, and Politics in
Cold War Native America, 1945-1961, 92 J. AM. HIST. 1301, 1306-09 (2006).
89. ANDERSON, BERGER, FRICKEY & KRAKOFF,supra note 1, at 140-41.
90. Id. at 148-49.
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rights to justify their positions, with few exceptions there was little overlap
between those working for or against civil rights and tribal rights.9 1
Indian policy did, however, play a curious role in the arguments in Brown
v. Board of Education. When the case was first argued before the Court in
December of 1952, Justice Hugo Black asked Kansas Assistant Attorney
General Paul Wilson where Indians in the state went to school.92 Wilson replied
that Indians generally lived on reservations where they attended their own
schools, but if any lived in the cities they would go to the white schools.93
Justice Jackson, who was far from convinced that the Constitution could be
interpreted as the plaintiffs wished, returned to this issue, asking plaintiffs'
lawyer Thurgood Marshall what his position would mean for Indian policy.
Justice Jackson asserted that "on the historical argument, the philosophy of the
Fourteenth Amendment which you contended for does not seem to have been
applied by the people who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, at least in the
Indian case." 94 The Indian question was apparently the only one that surprised
the well-prepared NAACP team.9 5 Marshall answered in a scattershot fashion:
first, in all the southern states he knew, Indians were in a preferred position
over African Americans; second, the Fourteenth Amendment was passed for
the specific purpose of raising the newly freed slaves; but third, the amendment
would apply fully if the Indians took the time to litigate it.96 "I think," he
concluded, "that the biggest trouble with the Indians is that they just have not
had the judgment or the wherewithal to bring lawsuits."97 Seizing on this issue,
John Davis and Milton Korman, lawyers for the defendants, returned to the
91. Indeed, at times opponents of civil rights for African Americans used the rhetoric of
civil rights to undermine tribal rights for Indians. Berger, supra note 27, at 643-44.
92. BROWN v. BOARD: THE LANDMARK ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 29
(Leon Friedman ed., The New Press 2004) (1969) [hereinafter BROWN ORAL ARGUMENT].
93. Id.
94. Id at 50. Jackson, who lived close to the Seneca Reservation in New York, also threw
in that "In some respects, in taxes, at least, I wish I could claim to have a little Indian blood." Id.
The comment reveals significant ignorance of federal Indian law-an ignorance common in the
public, but dispiriting in a Justice ruling on Indian law cases. First, Indians pay all federal taxes,
and all state taxes except those for goods purchased on their reservation or for income earned in
their tribal territories while residing there. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, Supra
note 35, at 676, 711. Second, "a little Indian blood" is not sufficient for even this limited
exemption from taxation; rather, one must be a member of the tribe within whose territory the
otherwise taxable event occurs. See id. at 701; Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 160-61 (1980); United States ex rel. Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe v. South Dakota, 105 F.3d 1552, 1559-60 (8th Cir. 1997).
95. JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURT 175 (1994).
96. BROWN ORAL ARGUMENT, supra note 92, at 50.
97. Id This statement reveals the deep disconnect between those working for Indian rights
and African American rights. In the past few years, Indians had brought several successful
lawsuits asserting their right to vote, the National Congress of American Indians had become a
well-organized and influential pan-tribal voice on Indian policy, and tribes themselves were
embroiled in a number of lawsuits regarding their interests. See PHILP, supra note 87, at 2, 14-15,
21-22, 52, 60 (describing founding and influence of NCAI, and lawsuits regarding rights to vote
and tribal social security).
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claim that overturning separate but equal would undermine federal Indian
policy.98
There is no evidence that this debate influenced the Court's deliberations
or decision in Brown. Nor did concern about the impact of the Fourteenth
Amendment on Indians play a large role in the Court for the next few years. In
1954 and 1955, the Court twice ducked a straightforward civil rights issue
affecting Indians in Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Cemetery Association.99 In
Rice, the widow of a Winnebago soldier killed in the Korean War challenged
the refusal-made on the day of the funeral no less-to allow her husband's
remains to be buried in a cemetery covered by racially restrictive covenants. 00
The Court granted certiorari in the case, but first affirmed the Iowa Supreme
Court opinion denying the claim without opinion 1 and then granted rehearing
but vacated certiorari as improvidently granted. 102
The Court's unwillingness to stoke the embers lit by Brown explains the
Rice decisions, but no such public pressures explain the 1955 decision in Tee-
Hit-Ton Indians v. United States.103 Tee-Hit-Ton went further than any previous
decision to denigrate tribal property rights,1 4 holding that tribes had no Fifth
Amendment right to their lands unless the federal government had first
formally acknowledged their interests.105 Felix Cohen earlier called the casual
acquisition of Alaska Native land challenged in Tee-Hit-Ton the product of "the
feeling that Indians are not quite human, and certainly not fit to own their own
homes, cut their own trees, or mine their own lands," and dismissed
justifications for the seizure as "hollow rationalizations of racial prejudice." 06
Justice Reed, the Justice most reluctant to join in the unanimous Brown
opinion, wrote the opinion, and Justice Douglas, the Justice most ready to
follow his sense of racial justice, wrote the dissent.107 Even so, the majority and
dissent did not closely follow the allegiances formed in the civil rights cases,
and issues of race did not feature in the briefs or resulting opinions.
98. Id. at 51, 136-37, 216.
99. Rice v. Sioux City Mem'l Park Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
100. Rice v. Sioux City Mem'1 Park Cemetery, 60 N.W.2d 110, 112 (Iowa 1953).
101. Rice v. Sioux City Mem'1 Park Cemetery, 348 U.S. 880 (1954).
102. 349 U.S. at 77.
103. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
104. See Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title
Reconsidered, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1215, 1215, 1220 (1980) (calling Tee-Hit-Ton one of the most
"significant cases on the constitutional rights of Native Americans to their aboriginal lands," and
arguing that the decision was not supported by prior precedent).
105. Id.
106. Felix S. Cohen, Breaking Faith with our First Americans, 25 INDIAN TRUTH, No. 2,
Mar.-Apr. 1948.
107. ROGER K. NEUMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 432, 434 (2d ed. 1997); Alden
Whitman, William 0. Douglas Is Dead at 81; Served 36 Years on Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 20, 1980, at 1.
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Racial equality figured expressly in lower court arguments in Williams v.
Lee,o8 the next major Indian law case heard by the Court. The 1959 case
involved a collection action filed in Arizona state court against a Navajo couple
by a non-Indian, federally licensed trader who sold goods on the Navajo
Reservation.109 Indians had only recently won the right to vote in the state in a
1948 Arizona Supreme Court decision,"1 0 and both the plaintiffs briefs and the
trial court decision were full of assertions that continued immunity from state
jurisdiction was inconsistent with the citizenship of native people."'
Although argument in the Supreme Court did not dwell on these claims,
the Court was fully occupied by the civil rights question, having decided
Cooper v. Aaronll2 just two months earlier. In the unanimous Cooper decision,
the Court refused to enjoin implementation of Brown in Little Rock, Arkansas,
even in the face of massive resistance by the Arkansas governor, legislature,
and public. Although the obscure collection dispute in Williams may have
seemed insignificant compared to the constitutional showdown in Cooper,
Justice Black, who wrote the opinion in Williams, saw a paradoxical link
between the cases. Williams helped Justice Black, who was deeply committed
to the result in Brown, realize that respect for some marginalized groups meant
protecting their right to be "separate and independent and themselves."" 3 Just
as the Republicans had after the Civil War, Black saw the parallels between the
Supreme Court's championship of the Cherokees in their bitter struggle with
Georgia and the battle for civil rights.1 4 The Court's protection of tribal rights
in the face of state defiance, Black believed, was an indirect affirmation of its
duty to order integration in Brown and Cooper."15
B. Mancari and Subsequent Equal Protection Challenges
Over the next decade, as federal policy slowly turned toward the
enforcement of civil rights, it also turned to the recognition of tribal rights. By
the early 1970s, Congress and the Executive Branch had embraced tribal self-
determination as the goal of federal Indian policy."l6 At this moment the Court
108. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
109. Id.
110. Harrison v. Laveen, 196 P.2d 456 (Ariz. 1948).
111. Opinion and Order, Lee v. Williams (Az. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 1954), in Transcript of
Record filed with the Supreme Court in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), at 40-41, October
Term 1957, No. 811; Appellee's Answering Brief at 4, 15-17, Williams v. Lee, 319 P.2d 998
(Ariz. 1958) (No. 6172).
112. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). The Court issued its opinion in Cooper on
September 29, 1958, heard argument in Williams on November 20, 1958, and issued its opinion in
the case on January 6, 1959. Williams, 358 U.S. 217.
113. Interview with Judge Guido Calabresi, U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit (Dec.
29, 2008) (Judge Calabresi clerked for Justice Black during the relevant time).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. ANDERSON, BERGER, FRICKEY & KRAKOFF,supra note 1, at 149-55.
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faced Morton v. Mancari, its first and most direct confrontation between equal
protection and Indian law.117 Mancari emerged from developments both in
Indian law and in civil rights. In the early 1970s, native activists filed a
successful lawsuit challenging the failure of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
to implement long-standing Indian employment preferences and the resulting
white dominance of higher-level positions at the Bureau. 18 In response, the
Secretary of the Interior agreed to implement the preference in all employment
decisions, including promotion."1 Four non-Indian BIA employees quickly
challenged the policy as violating both the 1972 Equal Employment
Opportunity Act and the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.120
Although many expected the Court to take this opportunity to opine on
benign racial preferences, 12 1 the Court chose not to address this issue head on.
Mancari did state that the "preference is reasonably and directly related to a
legitimate, nonracially based goal," which was "the principal characteristic that
generally is absent from proscribed forms of racial discrimination."1 22
However, that was not the primary theory for rejecting the constitutional
challenge.
Unfortunately, the primary theory was not entirely clear.123 In the portion
of the opinion some scholars have focused on,124 the Court stated that the
regulation "is not even a 'racial' preference," following this with a footnote
stating that "[t]he preference is not directed towards a 'racial' group consisting
of 'Indians'; instead, it applies only to members of 'federally recognized'
tribes. This operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be
classified as 'Indians.' In this sense, the preference is political rather than racial
in nature." 2 5 The Court went on to explain that the preference "is granted to
Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-
sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a
unique fashion." The preference was therefore "similar in kind to the
constitutional requirement that a United States Senator, when elected, be 'an
117. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
118. 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10582 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 1972), affd, 499 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Carol Goldberg, Morton v. Mancari: What's Race Got to Do with It?, in RACE LAW
STORIEs 237, 240-41 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon Wayne Carbado, eds., 2008).
119. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 538; Goldberg, supra note 118, at 243-44.
120. 417 U.S. at 539.
121. Goldberg, supra note 118, at 251, 256, 260. A few months earlier, the Court had
similarly ducked the affirmative action issue in holding a law student's challenge to race
conscious admission procedures moot. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
122. 417 U.S. at 554.
123. See also Goldberg, supra note 118, at 261-63 (discussing the multiple potential
theories suggested in the opinion); David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection
Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L REv. 759, 775 (1991) ("Mancari proposed several
different theories without plainly endorsing or adequately defending either one").
124. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 123, at 761.
125. 417 U.S. at 553 & n.24.
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Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen,' . . . or that a member of a
city council reside within the city governed by the council."l2 6 Although this
might be interpreted to mean that classifications of tribal members are not
racial at all, this conclusion is dissatisfying, particularly because the challenged
regulation itself required individuals to be both tribal members and have at
least one-quarter Indian blood to qualify for the preference.' 27 Fully extended,
moreover, the suggestion that classifications based on tribal membership are
never racial would greatly limit scrutiny of state measures, such as voting
restrictions, which exclude Indians because of their connections to Indian
tribes.128
These difficulties are resolved by reading the constitutional section of the
opinion as a whole, and understanding the political-not-racial distinction in
light of the discussion of the federal-tribal relationship with which the section
begins.129 The section begins by tying the legal status of the federal-tribal
relationship to its historical and normative underpinnings: "Resolution of the
instant issue turns on the unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal law
and ... a history of treaties and the assumption of a 'guardian-ward' status, to
legislate on behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes. 13 0 The opinion then
sets forth the ways the constitutional text enshrines this relationship. Article I of
the Constitution gives Congress the power to "regulate Commerce. . . with the
Indian tribes,"' 3 thereby explicitly recognizing Indian tribes as an appropriate
subject for federal legislation.132 Through the Article II treaty power, moreover,
the United States has entered into numerous treaties with Indian tribes, creating
distinct federal obligations to Indian peoples.' 3 3 Although these provisions do not
necessarily give federal power in Indian affairs the unlimited scope the Court has
claimed for it in recent years,134 they do provide textual hooks for a power that
126. Id at 554.
127. Id at 553 n.24.
128. See Berger, supra note 27, at 645-46.
129. For other arguments along these lines, see COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW, supra note 35, at 926-28, and Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Not "Strictly" Racial: A
Response to "Indians as Peoples," 39 UCLA L. REV. 169, 172 (1991). I should note that
Professor Frickey himself likely did not have such a favorable reading of Mancari. He has
described it as resting on a "double-barreled cluster of constitutional fictions": that the
Constitution provides Congress with plenary power over Indians; that there is "something called
'the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment'; and that
classification of members of tribes is solely political and not racial. Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication
and its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1754,
1759, 1760-62 (1997). While agreeing with some of the sources of this criticism, I disagree with
the work they do in the opinion. First, I do not see the opinion as depending on constitutionally
granted federal plenary power, but rather simply on the special federal-tribal relationship, and
second, I do not see the political-not-racial statements as core to its rationale.
130. 417 U.S. at 551.
131. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see also 417 U.S. at 552.
132. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 129, at 174-75.
133. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also 417 U.S. at 552.
134. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (stating
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recognizes both Indians and tribes as distinct subjects for legislation.
The Court bolstered its textual argument in Mancari with historical and
normative arguments. It described how, over the course of centuries, the federal
government took much land from native peoples, both promising them protection
in return and leaving them in dire need of it. 135 Subjecting all classifications of
tribes and their descendants to strict scrutiny at this point would not only
invalidate an entire body of law, but would also violate the "solemn commitment
of the Government toward the Indians." 136 Therefore, Mancari held, different
treatment of Indian people by the federal government is not subject to the strict
scrutiny reserved for racial classifications, but instead will be upheld if it "can be
tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the
Indians."' 37
By emphasizing that the preference attached only to members of federally
recognized tribes and concerned entities that governed those tribes in a unique
fashion, therefore, the Court was not positing a counterfactual nonracial status
for Indian people, but was instead demonstrating the ways the classification
fulfilled the goals emerging from the unique federal relationship. The
preference easily satisfied this test, as it concerned an agency with "plenary
control, for all practical purposes, over the lives and destinies of the federally
recognized Indian tribes," and in fact replaced a proposal to allow tribes
themselves to directly administer government services on their reservations. 1
The opinion thus echoes the views of Republican Congressmen during
Reconstruction. Both the 1860s legislators and the 1970s Court asserted that the
federal government has a special relationship with Indian people and tribes, one
rooted in the original political status of tribes and sanctioned by constitutional
text, norms, and historical practice. Both, therefore, rejected arguments that the
Fourteenth Amendment undermined federal attempts to recognize that
relationship or fulfill the obligations emerging from it.
Subsequent decisions relied on Mancari but did not develop or clarify its
reasoning. The first, the 1976 decision Fisher v. District Courtl39 was an easy
application of Mancari. It held that the exclusion of state court jurisdiction over
an adoption dispute between tribal members was not impermissible racial
discrimination but rather a necessary result of retained self-government of the
that Commerce Clause gives Congress plenary power in Indian affairs). Contra Frickey, supra
note 128, at 1761 (arguing that plenary power cannot be found in the Commerce Clause).
135. 417 U.S. at 552. It is true that the language in this section, which quotes from a 1943
opinion, has more of the flavor of paternalism toward an "uneducated, helpless, and dependent
people," than that of a relationship of one political entity to another. Id. (quoting Bd. of County
Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 715 (1943)).
136. Id. at 552.
137. Id at 555.
138. Id. at 542.
139. Fisher v. Dist. Ct., 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
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tribe,14 something clearly within the federal government's unique relationship
to the Indians. But later decisions essentially washed away Mancari's
complexity by upholding governmental actions if they met minimal standards
of rationality or solely classified tribal members.141 In 1977, Delaware Tribal
Business Committee v. Weeks1 42 upheld a congressional scheme that excluded
the Kansas Delawares from distribution of a judgment award to Delaware
descendants against an equal protection challenge. The Court rejected the
plaintiffs' claims on the grounds that Congress could rationally have found that
excluding them was consistent with its obligations, 14 3 although the evidence
showed that excluding them was in fact a congressional oversight.'" By
upholding the exclusion of the Kansas Delawares as "rational" despite the
reality that no thought whatsoever had gone into their exclusion, the Court
suggested that the Mancari test was a largely toothless rubric to sanction
federal action. The same year, United States v. Antelope1 4 5 upheld the disparate
consequences of federal Indian law's complicated jurisdictional scheme on
Indians and non-Indians. The opinion, despite long quotes from Mancari's
discussion of the special federal-tribal relationship, did not discuss how the
scheme fell within that relationship, but instead relied solely on Mancari's
political-not-racial language and the tribal membership of the defendants. 14 6
Subsequently, Washington v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima
Nationl4 7 clarified that state classifications of Indians would be upheld under
the Mancari test if-and only if-they implemented federal obligations toward
Indians, but treated the question of whether the classification did in fact further
that scheme as subject to the most minimal rationality test. 148 Together, these
cases recite the language of Mancari while utterly failing to explain its
rationale or build on its potential.
C. Conclusion
The modem era began with uncertainty as to whether Indian policy could
survive under a robust understanding of equal protection, but shifted to an
implicit recognition that tribal rights and civil rights are complementary rather
than antagonistic. This recognition received judicial imprimatur with Morton v.
140. Id. at 390-91.
141. See also Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195, 274-86 (1984) (critiquing post-Mancari equal protection
jurisprudence).
142. Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
143. Id. at 86.
144. Id. at 89.
145. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
146. Id. at 644-47.
147. Washington v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463
(1979).
148. Id. at 501-02.
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Mancari, which recognized both the distinctive political status of Indian people
and tribes under constitutional law, and the reasons that federal recognition of
this distinctness did not violate equal protection. Subsequent decisions have
upheld federal and even state classifications of Indians, but with little scrutiny
of any tie between these classifications and the obligations arising from the
federal-tribal relationship. None of these decisions were necessarily wrong
under Mancari.14 9 But by implying that all classifications are valid so long as
they either only reach tribal members or are amenable to some minimally
rational post-hoc justification, these decisions fail to develop Mancari's
potential to provide a normatively attractive reconciliation between federal
Indian law and the mandate of equal protection. As I discuss next, this failure is
beginning to have serious consequences for tribal and indigenous rights.
III
CURRENT EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES TO FEDERAL INDIAN
POLICIES
The need for a coherent reconciliation of policies regarding native peoples
and the principles of equal protection has become more pressing in the face of
popular and judicial backlash against both affirmative action and tribal
sovereignty. In the late 1970s, as the Court minimized the potential of equal
protection challenges to federal Indian policies, it also laid the groundwork for
equal protection challenges to affirmative action. In the wake of Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 1o the Court repeatedly struck down race-
conscious measures intended to address inequality,'5 1 and further held that
strict scrutiny applied even to race-conscious programs created by the federal
government.15 2 Popular backlash against affirmative action has also grown;
149. The classification in Antelope, for example, was based on the special federal
jurisdictional status of crimes by or against Indians on tribal land, something easily justified under
the federal government's unique obligations to Indian people. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (justifying federal rather than state jurisdiction because states are often
Indians' "deadliest enemies" and the federal government has a duty to protect Indians). The
impact for the particular defendants in Antelope results from this jurisdictional difference, and the
federal government's acceptance and Idaho's rejection of the felony murder rule. While the Court
in Antelope noted this latter reason for rejecting the equal protection challenge, it did not deem it
necessary to explain why the jurisdictional difference fit within Congress's obligations to the
Indians. 430 U.S. at 648-50.
150. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(invalidating affirmative action scheme creating preference for minority medical school
applicants).
151. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989).
152. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). While the Court had
long held that the Fifth Amendment prohibits racial discrimination by the federal government,
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), it had previously upheld race-conscious affirmative action
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today, suggestions that the government unfairly disadvantages whites carry a
powerful political punch.15 3
In the Supreme Court this backlash has largely manifested itself
indirectly, as the Court has limited tribal sovereignty for reasons that hint at,
but do not turn on, an equal protection violation. 154 A few lower court cases
have also turned in part on concerns that federal Indian law measures might
violate equal protection.' 55 This Part shows how a better understanding of the
consistency between equal protection and federal Indian law may ameliorate
these concerns. In particular, it considers two likely targets of future
challenges: the Duro Fix,15 6 which affirms tribal criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians; and measures regarding Native Hawaiian sovereignty and
property rights. Both measures, this Section shows, respond to and partially
undo the denial of equal political rights founded in racialized images of native
peoples, and thereby actually further the goals of equal protection.
A. Challenges to the Duro Fix
The statutory Duro Fix' 5 may well be the occasion for the Supreme Court
to revisit Mancari. This 1991 Act abrogated the holding in Duro v. Reina15
that tribes lacked criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, by affirming
programs. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448 (1980) (plurality opinion). The defendants argued in Adarand that Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress special discretion to implement race-conscious measures
to accomplish the amendment's goals. 515 U.S. at 244 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. For evidence of this, consider the political fodder created during the confirmation
hearings for Justice Sotomayor, an extremely moderate and well-qualified candidate, over her
participation in a per curiam panel summarily affirming Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142
(D. Conn. 2006), aff'd 530 F. 3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008), rev'd 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
154. See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 692-93 (1990) (suggesting that tribal criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians was prohibited because it had not yet included them in
legislation satisfying the Mancari test, and that Indians could not be subject to tribunals of
governments that did not include them and did not provide full constitutional rights). The district
court and a dissenting member of the Ninth Circuit panel in Duro found that jurisdiction violated
the equal protection provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act. Duro v. Reina, 821 F.2d 1258, 1362
(9th Cir. 1987) (discussing unpublished district court holding); Id. at 1365 (Sneed, J., dissenting).
155. See, e.g., Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the Department
of the Interior's interpretation of the Reindeer Act to prevent reindeer-herding by non-Alaska
Natives to avoid equal protection problems; In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 730-31 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2001) (applying strict scrutiny to hold that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)
was unconstitutional as applied to a child of Chippewa descent whose tribal-member mother had
not demonstrated sufficient connections to her tribe); see also Goldberg, Descent, supra note 15
(critiquing these decisions and the assumptions behind them). A more recent decision that is
arguably more consistent with Mancari is In re A.W., 71 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 2007) (holding
unconstitutional state statute that applied ICWA to children the tribe identified as members of
their community where children so identified had no contact with the tribe and no eligibility for
membership).
156. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006).
157. Id.
158. Duro, 495 U.S. 676.
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that tribes have inherent criminal jurisdiction over Indians who are not
members of the governing tribe. Because the Supreme Court had previously
held in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe1 59 that non-Indians were not subject
to tribal criminal jurisdiction, and the Duro Fix affirms jurisdiction over non-
member Indians but not over non-Indians, the measure has been challenged as
racially discriminatory.'6 0 Although the Supreme Court upheld the statute
against a double jeopardy challenge in 2004, it pointedly left the equal
protection question open for future decisions. 6 ' I argue that by undermining
the historic racism that supports Duro, and responding to the decision by tribal
sovereigns to subject their citizens reciprocally to each other's jurisdiction, the
legislation promotes not racial discrimination but the equality at the heart of the
equal protection norm.
As the Ninth Circuit explained in Means v. Navajo Nation,162 the Duro Fix
easily passes constitutional muster under Mancari analysis. First, by furthering
tribal self-government and law and order on reservations, the Duro Fix is clearly
related to the unique federal obligations to Indian tribes.'63 Second, to come
within Duro Fix jurisdiction one must have not only some Indian heritage but
also be recognized as politically a member of an Indian community. 64
This easy legal answer may, however, leave observers uncomfortable. Even
the court in Means acknowledged that "[the plaintiffs] equal protection
argument has real force." 65 The Act subjects only Indians, and not "whites,
blacks, Asians, or any other non-Navajos who are accused of crimes on the
reservation," to the criminal jurisdiction of entities that are not bound by the
U.S. Constitution, and of which they can never become members.166 Although
these arguments do point to real differences between tribes and state
governments, both history and modem context suggest that the Duro Fix in fact
mitigates distinctions grounded in racialization of Indian tribes.
Consider the context of the line of cases limiting tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers. As a number of scholars have argued, these cases are rooted in the
159. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
160. See Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 932 (9th Cir. 2005); Morris v. Tanner,
288 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1141-43 (D. Mont. 2003), aff'd, 160 Fed. App'x 600 (9th Cir. 2005)
(unpublished opinion) (rejecting equal protection claims of defendants).
161. United States. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 209 (2004).
162. Means, 432 F.3d 924.
163. Id. at 932-35.
164. Id at 934. To qualify as "Indian" for criminal jurisdiction purposes one must both
have some heritage from the indigenous peoples in the Americas before European settlement, and
have a recognized political affiliation with a federally recognized tribe. See United States v.
Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1280
(10th Cir. 2001). Thus individuals who are racially Indian but who are not recognized as
politically Indian are not subject to tribal criminal jurisdiction. See In re Garvais, 402 F. Supp. 2d
1219, 1225-26 (E.D. Wash. 2004) (holding that a man with 6/32ds Indian blood who worked for a
tribe was not an Indian for criminal jurisdiction purposes).
165. Means, 432 F.3d at 932.
166. Id.
1190 [Vol. 98:1165
EQUAL PROTECTION AND FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
racialized norms of colonialism: a hackneyed sense of what is acceptably Indian,
a doubt in the ability of tribal courts to administer justice fairly, and a desire to
limit the authority Indians wield over non-Indians. 167 Duro was particularly frank
about this, resting its decision on the "special nature of the tribunals at issue,"l 6 8
which, it asserted, were "influenced by the unique customs, languages, and
usages of the tribes they serve,"' 69 often "'subordinate to the political branches
of tribal governments,"' and whose legal methods sometimes depended on
"'unspoken practices and norms." 170 These qualities do not receive the same
condemnation when they characterize non-Indian tribunals. As Professor
Frickey recently pointed out, such unspoken practices and norms are celebrated
when they are part of nontribal small-town justice.171
Still, the statute does not fully overrule this line of cases, but only subjects
members of other tribes to tribal jurisdiction. One might argue that this
distinction only compounds the offense of the original decisions, assuming a
commonality between members of different tribes who share nothing but
descent from the many different peoples that European American settlers
labeled "Indian." The history of the Duro Fix shifts this perception. The Duro
Fix was not imposed by a Congress that believed that tribal criminal
jurisdiction was good enough for Indians even if not good enough for others, or
that all Indians were the same. It was instead the result of a multilateral
decision by tribal sovereigns to subject their citizens to each other's
jurisdiction.
Duro v. Reina generated an immediate reaction in Indian country; within a
few weeks of the decision, tribal leaders from across the country gathered to
forge a legislative response.172 Native people and those working with them
shaped the legislation over the course of that summer, through numerous
meetings and conference calls with tribal officials and Indian organizations.173
The Justice Department responded to the bill by asserting "all Indian legislation
167. See, e.g., Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers
in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047, 1050-51 (2005); Philip P. Frickey, A Common
Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority Over
Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1999) (describing nonmember jurisdiction cases as rooted in a
"normatively unattractive judicial colonial impulse"); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of
Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian
Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219, 274 (1986) (calling Oliphant a "legal auto-genocide, the
ultimate hegemonic effect of which is to instruct the savage to self-extinguish all troublesome
expressions of difference that diverge from the white man's own hierarchic universalized
worldview").
168. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Philip P. Frickey, Tribal Law, Tribal Context, and the Federal Courts, 18 KAN. J.L. &
PuB. POL'Y 24 (2008).
172. Bethany R. Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story of Indian Agency, 40 TULSA L.
REv. 5, 11 (2004).
173. Id. at 11, 13.
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is unconstitutional because it is race-based."' 7 4 But the Duro Fix, reaffirming
tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, entered into law as a temporary
measure six months later,'75 and became permanent the following year.'76
Throughout the drafting process and in the hearings to follow, both tribal
leaders and Indian people were unanimous in their support before Congress. 7 7
Not surprisingly, since the Duro Fix was enacted, some individual Indian
defendants facing tribal punishments have challenged the law.17 8 But in the
year and a half that the legislation was debated across Indian country, no tribal
members came forward to oppose the bill. While opponents of the bill referred
to the alleged unfairness and unconstitutionality of tribal governments,179 the
Indians who testified rejected these concerns. Kevin Gover, a Pawnee
Comanche attorney, testified, "'the Indians who are here before you, we say
freely when we go onto another reservation, we are willing to be subject to
those laws. That is what we prefer, frankly, to being subject to the States or
even to the U.S. courts."' 80 Philip Sam Deloria, a drafter of the legislation and
citizen of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, testified that he had lived on
reservations of two tribes of which he was not a member and he "'felt safer
living on the Pine Ridge Reservation than I certainly do living in Albuquerque,
New Mexico sometimes."" 8' Professor Alex Tallchief Skibine, an Osage
citizen, later opined, "the fact that most Indian judicial systems are not bound
by the Constitution is not half as threatening to most Indians as the racial
prejudice they can encounter in non-Indian courts."1 8 2 In an age of federal
plenary power over Indian tribes, there is no democratic mechanism by which
tribal communities can choose the federal law that governs their lives. But
within this flawed system, the Duro Fix is as close as it gets: legislation
catalyzed by and drafted from within Indian country and supported
unwaveringly by tribal leaders and Indian people themselves.
174. The Honorable Robert Yazzie, "Watch Your Six": An Indian Nation Judge's View of
25 Years of Indian Law, Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 497,
498 (1998/1999) (recounting conversation with Senate Indian Affairs Committee staffer).
175. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077, 104
Stat. 1856, 1892 (1990).
176. Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 1301 (2006)).
177. See, e.g., Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the Legislation that Overturned
It: A Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 767, 768-69 (1993)
(discussing reasons for the willingness of tribes to support the bill).
178. See Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2005); Morris v. Tanner, 288 F.
Supp. 2d 1133 (D. Mont. 2003), affd, 160 Fed. App'x 600 (9th Cir. 2005); see also U.S. v. Lara,
541 U.S. 193 (2004) (challenging Duro Fix on grounds that federal prosecution after tribal
prosecution was double jeopardy).
179. Berger, supra note 172, at 16.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Skibine, supra note 176, at 769.
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This context eliminates the apparent force of equal protection challenges
to the Duro Fix. First, the legislation itself is consistent with the spirit of equal
protection because it partially reverses discrimination against tribal
governments by restoring a measure of their territorial sovereignty. Second, this
differential treatment does not reflect the choices of political bodies that
exclude the defendants, but instead the choices of the tribes that include them in
concert with other tribes from across the country. Indeed, as legislation that
begins to recapture the government-to-government negotiations of the treaty
process, the legislative process leading to the Duro Fix itself counters some of
the discriminatory excesses of the nineteenth-century plenary power decisions.
B. Challenges to Measures Regarding Native Hawaiians
Challenges to measures regarding Native Hawaiians constitute another
growing area of equal protection litigation. Although Native Hawaiians have
not historically been accorded the same rights as American Indians, they face
comparable denials of sovereignty and property rights and are increasingly
recognized to have a similar trust relationship with the United States.m Thus
while Native Hawaiian classifications do not automatically come within the
safe harbor Mancari provides for American Indian classifications, equal
protection challenges regarding Native Hawaiians implicate similar questions
and should be analyzed under similar principles.
In 2000, the Supreme Court decided Rice v. Cayetano, a challenge to a
state constitutional provision that limited the right to vote in elections for the
trustees of Hawaii's Office of Hawaiian Affairs to people of Native Hawaiian
descent.184 Although some thought the Court might take this opportunity to
reconsider Mancari, Rice struck down the measure on separate grounds. First,
Rice did not turn on equal protection, but rather relied on the Fifteenth
Amendment's specific prohibition on the abridgement of the right to vote on
account of race.' 85 Second, the Court held that as a restriction on elections for
state office, the limitation was not subject to the special rules that might apply
to a tribal election or federal agency like the BIA.1 6
Since Rice, "[w]hite plaintiffs have brought lawsuits challenging nearly
,,187
every public and private program benefiting native Hawai'ians. Opponents
have lodged equal protection attacks on measures regarding Native Hawaiians'
equal protection in Congress as well. Claims of racial classification have
repeatedly blocked reauthorization of the Hawaiian Homeownership
Opportunity Act, the successor to an 87-year-old program seeking to address
183. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 35, at 364-65.
184. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
185. Id. at 517 (construing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).
186. Id. at 520-22.
187. GROSS, supra note 12, at 205.
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the dispossession of Native Hawaiians from their historic lands.'8 More
significantly, efforts to provide Native Hawaiians with a measure of
sovereignty similar to that of American Indian tribes have failed to pass in large
part because of racial discrimination challenges. 89 A closer examination of the
historical context, however, shows that the denial of Native Hawaiian
sovereignty and property followed the familiar process of treating indigenous
peoples as a race in need of reformation rather than a polity with political
rights. Measures that seek to restore a portion of what this racialization took
away should not falter under the guise of equal protection.
The annexation of Hawaii and deprivation of Native Hawaiians' land and
sovereignty, while driven significantly by economic interests, was infused with
racism as well. The United States and European countries initially recognized
the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Hawaii, signing treaties with it as an
independent nation.' 90 Anglo-Americans also recognized Native Hawaiians'
property rights in their lands, in part because of their dense and productive
agricultural cultivation of the islands.19' Despite this, they also saw Hawaii, its
government, and its customs as distinctly inferior, and in need of reform and
civilization through exposure to superior European and American culture. The
memoirs of Hiram Bingham I, who was among the first group of American
missionaries to arrive in Hawaii and who would later intervene significantly in
Hawaiian political affairs, are almost a caricature of these sentiments. Bingham
opens by describing the Hawaiian past as one in which a "gross darkness"
covered its "stupid, unlettered, unsanctified heathen tribes."' 92 Bingham's
description of the Native Hawaiian political and property regime is equally
derogatory: "This, in a conquered, ignorant and heathen country, without the
principles of equity, was a low and revolting state of society." 93 While others
were not as forthright in their condemnation of all that was indigenous to the
Hawaiian people, they were firmly convinced that it was backwards, wrong,
and in need of reformation by Anglo-Americans.1 9 4
188. Democrats Pass Native Hawaiian Bill on Second Try, Indianz.com, Mar. 29, 2007,
http://64.38.12.138/News/2007/002124.asp. The law was never reauthorized, although Congress
has appropriated funds to continue the program. NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN HOUSING
COUNCIL, WHITE PAPER ON LEGISLATION To REAUTHORIZE TITLE VIII oF NAHASDA (Feb. 20,
2009), http://www.naihc.net/NAIHC/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000002122/02232009-
Hawiian-Memo-NAHASDA.pdf.
189. See, e.g., Presidential Statement on H.R. 505 (opposing bill as racially discrim-
inatory).
190. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 35, at 366.
191. Stuart Banner, Preparing to Be Colonized: Land Tenure and Legal Strategy in
Nineteenth-Century Hawaii, 39 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 273, 279-80 (2005).
192. HIRAM BINGHAM, A RESIDENCE OF TWENTY-ONE YEARS IN THE SANDWICH ISLANDS
OR THE CIVIL, RELIGIOUS, AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF THOSE ISLANDS 17, 18 (3d ed. 1849).
193. Id at 49.
194. See, e.g., Alfred Brophy, How Missionaries Thought: About Property Law, For
Instance, 30 U. HAw. L. REV. 373 (2008) (documenting missionaries' attitudes toward Hawaiian
property use); see also Banner, supra note 191, at 283-85, 287 (recounting Anglo-American
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The story of Hawaiian colonization in the nineteenth century is not a
simple one of Anglo-American domination; native elites often accommodated
and even cooperated with the non-Hawaiian settlers in an effort to preserve
their power and further their own interests. 195 But when Hawaiian leaders
stopped accommodating, they met with American force. In 1893, when Queen
Liliuokalani sought to restore power to Hawaii's native government, American
sugar interests forcibly deposed her with the backing of U.S. Marines. 196 Loath
to sanction the illegal coup and acquire a predominantly non-white territory,
Presidents Harrison and Cleveland initially refused to annex Hawaii to the
United States.197 President McKinley, however, ran for office in 1896 on a pro-
annexation platform, arguing that although most residents of the islands were
Native Hawaiian or Asian, they were under the control of the superior white
minority, and annexation was a necessary preventative against Japanese
takeover.198 In 1898, amidst the fervor surrounding the Spanish American War,
President McKinley secured the political domination of the territory of Hawaii
and the appropriation of its lands.199 The decision to annex Hawaii reveals the
same denigration of indigenous interests and governments familiar from
American Indian history.
Race played an even more explicit role in the subsequent creation of the
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act.200 The Act set aside 200,000 of the 1.8
million acres held by the government of Hawaii for homesteading by Native
Hawaiians. Native Hawaiian advocates introduced the measure, which orig-
inally required Native Hawaiian descent but no specific amount of Hawaiian
blood.201 This accorded with traditional ideas of Hawaiian identity, which, like
that of other indigenous groups, depended in part on descent or lineage.202
Non-Hawaiians, however, made eligibility turn on blood quantum.203 Pro-
sugar interests dictated this change: if the number of eligible homesteaders
were limited, more lands would remain free for the "Big Five" sugar
companies, whose plantations already dominated Hawaii's agricultural lands. 2 04
critique of Native Hawaiian property and governmental systems).
195. See Banner, supra notel91, at 277-78; see also RICHARD KLUGER, SEIZING DESTINY:
THE RELENTLESS EXPANSION OF AMERICAN TERRITORY 549 (2007) (describing embrace of
English language and Christian religion).
196. KLUGER, supra note 195, at 555-56.
197. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 35, at 367; KLUGER,
supra note 195, at 557-59; Apology Resolution, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993).
198. KLUGER, supra note 195, at 563.
199. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 35, at 368; KLUGER,
supra note 195, at 572-73. In 1993, Congress formally apologized for the "illegal overthrow of
the Kingdom of Hawaii" and the resulting "deprivation of the rights of Native Hawaiians to self-
determination." Apology Resolution, supra note 197.
200. Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, ch. 42, 42 Stat. 108 (1921).
201. GROss, supra note 12, at 189-90.
202. Id. at 184-85.
203. Id. at 186.
204. Id. at 186-87,201.
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Proponents of the limitation drew explicitly on ideas of racially derived
character. It was only the "pure" Hawaiian who was dying out and whose race
was worth saving.205 These arguments invoked both romantic images of a noble
race infused with the "spirit of aloha"206 and decidedly negative images
contrasting the part-Hawaiians with "these unenterprising, apathetic, thriftless
natives of the pure blood." 207 Arguments for preserving the pure Hawaiians
also received support from the virulent racism against the Japanese and Chinese
immigrants on whose labor the sugar industry depended, but whose numbers
the white population resented and feared.208 In the end, the Native Hawaiian
advocates of the Act accepted the half-blood limitation as the best they could
get.209 The result, however, was to erase their claims of justice, sovereignty,
and territory and put preservation of the purity of the race in their place. As
Ariela Gross writes, "race became the substitute for nationhood." 21 0
If the impact of racism for Native Hawaiians was to translate their
governmental bonds into racial ones, then recognizing the claims of their
descendants to political and property rights is the means to undo this racism.
Recognizing sovereign rights in Native Hawaiians and providing them with
financial support and governance rights on the lands of the former Kingdom of
Hawaii, far from creating racial inequality, instead takes tentative steps toward
correcting it.
CONCLUSION
Today, measures seeking to restore indigenous peoples to meaningful self-
governance and economic health are challenged as violating prohibitions on
equal protection. But the history, purpose, and context of equal protection and
federal Indian policy reveal that special federal treatment of Indians and tribes
is consistent with equal protection and in service of its basic goals. While an
anti-racial discrimination norm is at the core of equal protection, racial
discrimination for Indian peoples had less to do with defining individuals
according to race than with defining tribes as racial groups and denying them
sovereignty and property as a result. Policies that seek to fulfill promises made
to tribal governments, rebuild tribal lands, or restore tribes as political agents
with the ability to provide for their people mitigate the effects of this state-
sanctioned racial discrimination. These measures do not violate equal
protection; they further it.
205. Id. at 200.
206. Id. at 186.
207. Id. at 196 (quoting Alexander G.M. Robertson, chief justice for the Hawaiian
Territory and a lobbyist for the Parker Ranch).
208. Id. at 187, 189.
209. Id. at 201.
210. Id. at 179.
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Constitutional text, history and precedent affirm this argument. The
special relationship between Indian peoples and the federal government has
been recognized throughout American legal history and, when combined with
recognition of tribal rights, reflects deeply held norms of consent, respect, and
democracy. The written Constitution, while far from unambiguous, provides
textual support for this special relationship and the distinctive status of native
peoples under the Fourteenth Amendment. The proponents of the Fourteenth
Amendment, moreover, recognized the political status of tribes in the American
constitutional system, the consistency of this status with the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the legal and moral obligations placed on the federal
government as a result. Calls of inconsistency, in contrast, often came from
those-whether opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment or proponents of
separate but equal-who opposed faithful observation of either equal protection
or tribal rights. Although similar claims of inconsistency are being made again
today, they should be resolved in favor of the constitutional norms that support
both equal protection and tribal rights, and against any artificial consistency
that would undermine the fundamental principles on which both are based.
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